Obviously I have been incented to respond in exactly this way in order to appear either intelligent enough to belong to this group or humble enough to charm my way in. That said, I truly enjoyed this kick in the gray matter. I won't stop hating the people and ideas I find morally repugnant and terrifying, but it's good to know that I am as full of shit as anyone.
I would like to see David end up on Colbert, be asked this exact question, then stumble over his words right as he tries to deliver his clever response.
I loved this piece. It's definitely been harder to get worked up and to feel self-righteous about things in the news since reading your Substack (and this article in particular really clinches it). That's surely a good thing!
I am not a big fan of a lot of Evo psych out there. But what I do like is the tendency of Evo psych theorists to think beyond the self-congratulatory illusory way that a lot of mainstream psychology does (I sincerely doubt that most humans can honestly research their own behaviors in a semi-unbiased way) . Seeing how hollow and superficial most self-deception with people tends to be, this way of looking at behavior is not something you see with a lot of psychology anymore. Where it must always be some sort of noble social animal that has always the best interest at heart, either directly or indirectly. But when I observe people (as someone who has autism) I often see more of the self-deceptive egocentricity and the "look and sound the part of the social group but never seriously act the way." I. E. The cheap talk. And yes I know I am no better by definition of me being part of that same social species.
It's a good article. Can you suggest some good books that discuss this? I have read the elephant in the brain book. But that one was mostly a hypothesis (which they themselves are honest about) by two non-scientists. Can you suggest some books that are well supported by some good science that go over some of the topics you address on your articles or maybe some philosophical musings about it?
Thanks, Emiel. Probably my favorite evo psych book of the last decade is Hugo Mercier’s Not Born Yesterday. He’s an actual legit scientist in the field with data to stand on. If you like it I’d recommend his other book too, The Enigma of Reason. Other legit books: Raihani’s book The Social Instinct is great on the evo psych of cooperation. And though this isn’t evo psych I really enjoyed Caplan’s The Case Against Education, which goes more into detail on the evidence behind one of the hypotheses about education in the Elephant in the Brain (that education is about signaling). And though he’s not a scientist, Will Storr’s The Status Game is a very fun read—and does a great job applying the psychology of status to a lot of real-world examples.
”Incentive determinism is obvious. It’s just a bunch of tautologies: we are who we are, we want what we want, and we do what we’re caused to do. And yet, barely anybody thinks this way. It’s a cold, alien way of thinking.”
Someone who did think like that was B F Skinner. He had a bit of a different angle since he was also interested in reducing all mental life to behavior, but I think you may enjoy his old book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. I heard it was widely derided as authoritarian and creepy in its idea of a utopia based on optimal reinforcement schedules.
Yea, I'm actually a fan of Skinner. He got a lot wrong, and he was certainly creepy, but his relentless appeal to mechanistic thinking was helpful in getting psychology off the wrong track of freudian bafflegab. He's right that reinforcement learning is important; I think he just woefully underestimated the variety and complexity of the things that reinforce us, the complexity of the machinery that does the reinforcing, and the inevitable biases of the social engineers who would be appointed to design the reinforcement structure.
Definitely agree on his combination of setting things on the right track and partial naivety. I hope you didn’t read me as implying you’re creepy for being someone who respects him.
Anecdotally some of the most effective therapists I know have a strong behavioral focus, not out of some philosophical conviction in old-school behaviorism but simply because even if mental life is “more than mere behavior”all that complicated stuff matters less (and is more difficult to affect) than reinforcement contingencies.
Yea I think that’s a wise approach to therapy. Too much therapy is unfortunately about helping the patient come up with a bullshit story about the causes of their problems, rooted in their childhood or whatever.
"the more we all become aware of our incentive structures, the more incentivized we will be to choose them wisely"
The more I'm aware of incentive structures and how they work, the more likely I am to choose incentive structures and nudge them to be ones where I can succeed at them more easily or where they come more naturally to me. This has only coincidental relation to creating incentive structures that produce wider pro-social outcomes like capitalism did for intergroup cooperation. An argument could be made that less people know about incentive structures the better, because they'll be more likely to go along with incentive structures that we've stumbled across that works or that have been designed by more benevolent people.
I think if we're privately aware of our incentive structures, then you're right: we'll selfishly pick whichever one makes us better off. But if we're collectively aware of our incentive structures, and aware that others know that we're aware, then we have an incentive to pick one that makes everyone better off, so that people won't judge as selfish. So the key is achieving widespread awareness, or common knowledge, of our incentive structures. You're right that private awareness isn't enough.
Some time ago I read a bit about 'most disturbing movies'. The overarching theme in most of them is portraying bad people - nihilists, sadists, torturers, murderers - as protagonists - the 'good guys'. They succeed, don't get caught or punished otherwise and generally enjoy themselves - not in a sinister, evil, but a good, happy way.
Think of Hannibal Lecter but way more intense.
The bit about thinking in stories reminded me about all of that. It is not the violence that makes these movies disturbing - it's the cognitive dissonance between the storyline and everyday/mainstream culture stories we consume and think according to.
> So people who say things for a living, like intellectuals, pretend that what we say is all that matters—history is all about ideas—because it makes them seem more important than they really are
It would also appear that this is why they are often the ones to develop - in right political circumstances, i.e. when winning by force of coalition is uncertain - the "liberal" values against burning intellectuals at the stake. They have a strong incentive to convince people not to burn intellectuals at the stake - to mitigate (ii).
Yea, that's an interesting hypothesis. I think I buy it. The hypothesis would predict that the people with the highest support for free speech would be intellectuals who are uncertain or precarious politically--e.g., non-leftists or moderate leftists in academia. This seems to be very true based on my personal experience.
Over the past few years, what I've put in my news feeds has drifted away from outlets/journalists telling me 'stories' and more towards those doing 'analysis' i.e. those discussing incentives and accepting them for what they are. I like this because the best stuff really does help me understand the world better. If you want examples, look up the newsletter of British journalist Stephen Bush. He writes daily about the strategic dimensions of the stories of the day.
The other thing your post reminds me of is geopolitics. That seems to me a domain where people (journalists, academics, even political actors) talk more freely about incentives than most others.
This article is excellent. It really made me think, and I plan to share it widely.
However, after doing a fabulous job defining and explaining likeability determinism and the various problems with that narrative, you never get back to incentive determinism.
Is it your claim that incentive determinism explains *everything*? 95%? 90%? 80%?? If less than everything, what in your view are the next biggest explanatory factors after incentives?
Inquiring minds want to know… and you are welcome to more than five words for your answer
Thanks, Andy. I would say incentive structures explain 100% of the stuff that's capable of being explained by any theory--that is, the stuff that's not random. A big chunk of what goes on is random--e.g. why the coin lands on heads vs. tails. Randomness is hugely important, but we're trying to explain the part of reality that is not random. That is all we can do. And when we look at that part, incentives are everything.
Be clear I am totally with you that incentives explain an awful lot. The overwhelming majority.
But your claim is there is no free will at all?
And more specifically, that Adam Smith - the literal godfather of incentives! - in The Theory of Moral Sentiments was wrong when he said not only that humans want to be loved (again, your point) but also lovely? That they will not do the selfless good act even when they are certain no one is watching, if it causes them any negative self-interested harm at all?
Or are you suggesting that a person's view of themselves - self-deception or not - and desire to see themselves as good is just another incentive? But that of course, is a personal, intrinsic incentive, no?...
Yes, I do believe we have an incentive to see ourselves as good, but that is ultimately rooted in the desire to convince other people that we're good. We are better able to convince other people if we first convince ourselves. I write about this point here: https://www.optimallyirrational.com/p/the-truth-about-self-deception
Yeah, ok. I don't buy it. Irrespective of any evolutionary root you claim for it. Even if "We are better able to convince other people if we first convince ourselves" is 100% gospel truth.
At this point imo your claim that incentives explain everything is no longer explanatory, it's simply reductionist. I'll stick with Smith.
But thanks again for the interesting piece, especially the wonderful explication of "likability determinism." That portion is an excellent contribution to understanding human behavior / thought processes / irrationality.
Hm, curious. What don’t you buy? I agree with Smith that we want to be lovely, according to what our cultural peers deem lovely. And we want to convince ourselves that we’re lovely, so that we can better convince our peers. Those count as incentives. What’s the part you disagree with?
I disagree that a person's desire to be lovely is 100% caused by external incentives.
I disagree in particular that someone performing a "selfless" act, which is partly against his/her self-interest, when essentially certain that no one is watching, is solely or even primarily because of the incentive to self-deceive merely so that we can *better* convince others because of the incentive to be liked by others. If this fits your definition of incentives, then you have made the definition if not meaningless, then watered down to the point of no longer being nearly as useful.
Even were I to concede that your imo extreme definition of incentives and explanation of behavior was plausible, it doesn't make it likely, let alone probable, in terms of actually explaining human nature, behavior and decision-making today.
In other words, I believe that morality exists and that free will exists, and that even though incentives explain an enormous amount, they do not explain everything (other than a "random" unexplainable residual, per you).
You are definitively NOT agreeing with Smith on "being lovely", based on your description. While its definition is of course related to what our cultural peers deem lovely, being lovely is not defined exclusively by them, and it is certainly *distinct* from being loved by our peers, but you have already conflated the two.
As a non-trivial example, I believe that morality, much more than incentives (or "randomness*), explains why a lot of the fraction of 18-29 year olds who did *not* choose "Back Hamas" in the wake of the Oct 7th rampage made that choice, as oppose to the almost-equal fraction of miseducated young Americans who did [see Oct and Dec 2023 Harvard-Harris polls for the horrifying numbers here.] Obviously there are other factors than morality at play here (ability to reason, ...), but not all is explained by incentives, even if again I readily agree that quite a lot is.
Thanks for elaborating. Seems the disagreement lies in our differing views on free will and morality. Fair enough. I do have controversial views on those topics, and I don’t expect everyone to agree. Ultimately the reason I reject free will and morality as explanations (independent of incentives) is because they clash with the theory of evolution. They make no Darwinian sense. If you’re interested in the reasons why, I’d recommend my piece Darwin the Cynic. In any case, I’ll leave you with the question of how freely willed morality or selflessness could evolve if it is disconnected from anything that could affect fitness. I think it’s a picture of human nature that contradicts (or fits very poorly with) the only theory we can be pretty much be 100% is confident is true: evolution. That’s why I reject it. Thanks for reading and engaging in good faith. Cheers.
Well, given your Substack title, I'm gonna call BS.
First of all, you completely misunderstand Darwinism if you claim that anything that does not positively affect fitness cannot evolve as a package with other things that do. "Random" genetic mutation can and does indeed cause traits that survive despite their non-optimality. IMO you are now conflating Darwinism with Panglossianism.
Go search the Internet, perhaps, and you will see that Darwin believed in free will, and that many Darwinians view it as completely compatible with Darwinism. The idea that free will and morality are incompatible with Darwinism is nigh on ridiculous. But to be clear, this disagreement is not solely, nor even primarily, about whether you believe in "free will" per se.
And that's above and beyond the obvious point that over the last few thousand years, morality and the beyond-tribal-group measure of trust that it helps enable is in fact a positive fitness factor.
You unscientifically conflate ideas that are *largely* explanatory with assertions that they are *fully* so.
IMO Einstein's (paraphrased) quote of "Make everything as simple as possible, but no simpler" is directly relevant here.
But I do acknowledge there is one place you are being consistent. You value status and you have an incentive to make more outrageous claims in order to attain that status (or go for the tiny chance of what you view as much higher status), even if those claims lack not only evidence but require non-logic to get there.
My personal issue now is that your almost-total-certainty about incentive determinism being all-explanatory, and the (il)logic you use to try to justify it, means I am forced to discount as perhaps almost-randomness your excellent explanation of the differences between "incentive determinism" and "likability determinism".
In other words, whether because I'm concerned about my social status in promoting a crackpot, or just my intrinsic free will beliefs, I can't take you seriously, even though I love a couple of your narratives as being really good and helpful (when not taken to an unjustified extreme).
If you had a bit more epistemic humility ("I believe there is a good chance 'incentive determinism' explains nearly everything, but I know it doesn't explain literally everything, and I'm open to the possibility that it merely explains quite a lot"), I wouldn't have that problem...
It's fine to call my views bullshit, but there's no need to be rude about it or resort to name-calling. I think you are misunderstanding me. If you read the piece on Darwinian cynicism, you will see that I am not endorsing panglossianism. And the reason I am so confident in incentive determinism is not that I'm an arrogant fool, but because I see it as tautological. There are things in the world that we want, and we try to get them. That explains the nonrandom portion of our behavior. I honestly don't see what else could explain that portion of our behavior, aside from magic. Tell me what explains the nonrandom portion of our behavior other than us seeking what we want. Or tell me why I'm wrong about the list of things we want. What things am I missing? If there's something I'm missing, feel free to add it to the list as an incentive. If it's evolutionarily plausible, either as an adaptation or a byproduct of an adaptation (or a random mutation), I'll buy it, and I'll add it to the list myself. I'm genuinely not sure where the disagreement lies, or where the hostility is coming from.
Well, first, if my word choices offend you, I strongly suggest you change the name of your blog.
Fair question re: where the "hostility" is coming from:
- first, your original piece was interesting enough to be "worth it" (again the compliment: if you were just stupid or seemed purely a whacko, I would have just ignored you as not worthy of engaging with.)
- if your thesis and thus definition of determinism is tautological, it immediately becomes profoundly uninteresting. OTOH, I don't think you actually *do* mean it as purely tautological (see below)
- you at least recognize that your incentive determinism theory doesn't explain 100% of all human behavior, with your acknowledgement of a "random" component. But then...
- you are way beyond anything I've seen in terms of social science with a claim that your theory/story *completely* explains *all* human behavior. Frankly, even explaining an overwhelming majority is extremely rare (and one more time, I actually DO think your theory DOES indeed do that). I know far more about social sciences than I do about biology or sociobiology, but I don't think even biologists will generally claim that their pared down simple theories explain *everything*.
- I told you you were wrong about at least 1 thing we want: to be lovely (feel ourselves moral), even when no one is looking. But you either deny that that is possible, or claim, without either evidence or credible logic, that any such impulse is solely/entirely in service of other incentives.
- and if I am only allowed to categorize things that you are missing as incentives, as you just said above, you are explicitly ignoring me, and ignoring any legit scientific method.
- the nature of science, even social science, is to put forth something falsifiable. Your "everything that is not incentives is random" assertion is not falsifiable. At minimum, how can you not see/concede the *possibility* that some of what you classify as "random" might be able to be explained by someone else, in terms of something other than incentives?
- In this last note, you cite a quite reasonable word/standard: plausibility. But free will and morality are *of course* evolutionarily *plausible*. That's a very different standard than proven, probable or even likely. And not that it should be necessary, but I gave you an explanation above of why morality would be a positive Darwinian trait for humans in the last several thousand years. By contrast, you have surely NOT proven that it is not only a harmful trait, but so overwhelmingly harmful a one that it surely could not possibly have survived human evolution at even a minimal level.
- finally, the complete lack of epistemic humility - unwillingness to entertain/acknowledge even the *possibility* that you might be wrong, especially given that you are making *such* an incredibly strong claim of *completely* explaining human behavior - something too difficult for the greatest minds in history to have ever done - just rubs me the wrong way, for someone who at least *seems* to be talking about (social) science.
For that last, I guess I apologize for letting it set me off a bit.
Good stuff. It occurs to me that, although you never said it explicitly, this argument essential negates the idea of intrinsic motivation. That as long as there are other human beings around, all our incentives are external. That's a pretty big swing at the field of motivational research.
Thanks, Brian. Yes, I’m happy to take a swing at that field. I think a good chunk of what we consider intrinsic motivation (stuff we do “for its own sake”) is actually extrinsically motivated by social rewards, because those social rewards are often contingent on the appearance of intrinsic motivation. For example, we give people status for being brave and authentic and not caring what others think—i.e. being “intrinsically” motivated. I talk about this a lot in my preprint on psyarxiv “the evolution of social paradoxes.” My post “status is weird” summarizes most of the argument in non-academese. And my post “Darwin the cynic” makes an argument for why non-selfish, non-groupish, non-nepotistic motivations (which typically characterize our supposedly “intrinsic” motivations) are evolutionarily implausible. Though I might make an exception for some parts of our aesthetic motivations (which might have selfish benefits related to being in optimal environments or fine-tuning our perceptual equipment), most of our “intrinsic” motivations are bullshit.
I love this article and among my very favorite of yours, David - but I gotta object, foreclosing altogether on absolutely anyone's ability to transcend our evolutionary drivers and achieve authentic selfless altruism? There are positive outliers in any distribution... in any event, your over-the-top cynicism, your "cold, alien view" makes for super fun reading. What a writer you are!
Thank you for the kind words, Donald. I think I might be more pessimistic than you about our ability to transcend our basic evolved motives, though we might be able to channel those motives in beneficial directions with the right incentive structures. Our potential to do that, plus a bit of luck from the occasional outlier (a possibility you rightly note), gives me enough hope to get out of bed in the morning. Cheers.
"People don’t like incentive determinism because it’s disorienting. It tells us that our single greatest obsession, likability, is a distraction."
Perhaps. But the lonely nerd in his bedroom could probably do with focusing on being more likeable. He might be incentivised to do it, might know he's incentivised to do it, but not know how to or, if he does, not be able.
Obviously I have been incented to respond in exactly this way in order to appear either intelligent enough to belong to this group or humble enough to charm my way in. That said, I truly enjoyed this kick in the gray matter. I won't stop hating the people and ideas I find morally repugnant and terrifying, but it's good to know that I am as full of shit as anyone.
I would like to see David end up on Colbert, be asked this exact question, then stumble over his words right as he tries to deliver his clever response.
I loved this piece. It's definitely been harder to get worked up and to feel self-righteous about things in the news since reading your Substack (and this article in particular really clinches it). That's surely a good thing!
Absolute banger.
I am not a big fan of a lot of Evo psych out there. But what I do like is the tendency of Evo psych theorists to think beyond the self-congratulatory illusory way that a lot of mainstream psychology does (I sincerely doubt that most humans can honestly research their own behaviors in a semi-unbiased way) . Seeing how hollow and superficial most self-deception with people tends to be, this way of looking at behavior is not something you see with a lot of psychology anymore. Where it must always be some sort of noble social animal that has always the best interest at heart, either directly or indirectly. But when I observe people (as someone who has autism) I often see more of the self-deceptive egocentricity and the "look and sound the part of the social group but never seriously act the way." I. E. The cheap talk. And yes I know I am no better by definition of me being part of that same social species.
It's a good article. Can you suggest some good books that discuss this? I have read the elephant in the brain book. But that one was mostly a hypothesis (which they themselves are honest about) by two non-scientists. Can you suggest some books that are well supported by some good science that go over some of the topics you address on your articles or maybe some philosophical musings about it?
Thanks, Emiel. Probably my favorite evo psych book of the last decade is Hugo Mercier’s Not Born Yesterday. He’s an actual legit scientist in the field with data to stand on. If you like it I’d recommend his other book too, The Enigma of Reason. Other legit books: Raihani’s book The Social Instinct is great on the evo psych of cooperation. And though this isn’t evo psych I really enjoyed Caplan’s The Case Against Education, which goes more into detail on the evidence behind one of the hypotheses about education in the Elephant in the Brain (that education is about signaling). And though he’s not a scientist, Will Storr’s The Status Game is a very fun read—and does a great job applying the psychology of status to a lot of real-world examples.
”Incentive determinism is obvious. It’s just a bunch of tautologies: we are who we are, we want what we want, and we do what we’re caused to do. And yet, barely anybody thinks this way. It’s a cold, alien way of thinking.”
Someone who did think like that was B F Skinner. He had a bit of a different angle since he was also interested in reducing all mental life to behavior, but I think you may enjoy his old book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. I heard it was widely derided as authoritarian and creepy in its idea of a utopia based on optimal reinforcement schedules.
Yea, I'm actually a fan of Skinner. He got a lot wrong, and he was certainly creepy, but his relentless appeal to mechanistic thinking was helpful in getting psychology off the wrong track of freudian bafflegab. He's right that reinforcement learning is important; I think he just woefully underestimated the variety and complexity of the things that reinforce us, the complexity of the machinery that does the reinforcing, and the inevitable biases of the social engineers who would be appointed to design the reinforcement structure.
Definitely agree on his combination of setting things on the right track and partial naivety. I hope you didn’t read me as implying you’re creepy for being someone who respects him.
Anecdotally some of the most effective therapists I know have a strong behavioral focus, not out of some philosophical conviction in old-school behaviorism but simply because even if mental life is “more than mere behavior”all that complicated stuff matters less (and is more difficult to affect) than reinforcement contingencies.
Yea I think that’s a wise approach to therapy. Too much therapy is unfortunately about helping the patient come up with a bullshit story about the causes of their problems, rooted in their childhood or whatever.
"the more we all become aware of our incentive structures, the more incentivized we will be to choose them wisely"
The more I'm aware of incentive structures and how they work, the more likely I am to choose incentive structures and nudge them to be ones where I can succeed at them more easily or where they come more naturally to me. This has only coincidental relation to creating incentive structures that produce wider pro-social outcomes like capitalism did for intergroup cooperation. An argument could be made that less people know about incentive structures the better, because they'll be more likely to go along with incentive structures that we've stumbled across that works or that have been designed by more benevolent people.
I think if we're privately aware of our incentive structures, then you're right: we'll selfishly pick whichever one makes us better off. But if we're collectively aware of our incentive structures, and aware that others know that we're aware, then we have an incentive to pick one that makes everyone better off, so that people won't judge as selfish. So the key is achieving widespread awareness, or common knowledge, of our incentive structures. You're right that private awareness isn't enough.
Some time ago I read a bit about 'most disturbing movies'. The overarching theme in most of them is portraying bad people - nihilists, sadists, torturers, murderers - as protagonists - the 'good guys'. They succeed, don't get caught or punished otherwise and generally enjoy themselves - not in a sinister, evil, but a good, happy way.
Think of Hannibal Lecter but way more intense.
The bit about thinking in stories reminded me about all of that. It is not the violence that makes these movies disturbing - it's the cognitive dissonance between the storyline and everyday/mainstream culture stories we consume and think according to.
Do you remember any of the movies that were mentioned?
Salo: 120 days of sodom, the August Underground series or anything by Marian Dora to name a few.
> So people who say things for a living, like intellectuals, pretend that what we say is all that matters—history is all about ideas—because it makes them seem more important than they really are
It would also appear that this is why they are often the ones to develop - in right political circumstances, i.e. when winning by force of coalition is uncertain - the "liberal" values against burning intellectuals at the stake. They have a strong incentive to convince people not to burn intellectuals at the stake - to mitigate (ii).
Yea, that's an interesting hypothesis. I think I buy it. The hypothesis would predict that the people with the highest support for free speech would be intellectuals who are uncertain or precarious politically--e.g., non-leftists or moderate leftists in academia. This seems to be very true based on my personal experience.
Nice post!
Over the past few years, what I've put in my news feeds has drifted away from outlets/journalists telling me 'stories' and more towards those doing 'analysis' i.e. those discussing incentives and accepting them for what they are. I like this because the best stuff really does help me understand the world better. If you want examples, look up the newsletter of British journalist Stephen Bush. He writes daily about the strategic dimensions of the stories of the day.
The other thing your post reminds me of is geopolitics. That seems to me a domain where people (journalists, academics, even political actors) talk more freely about incentives than most others.
Cool, thanks for the recs, Thom!
This article is excellent. It really made me think, and I plan to share it widely.
However, after doing a fabulous job defining and explaining likeability determinism and the various problems with that narrative, you never get back to incentive determinism.
Is it your claim that incentive determinism explains *everything*? 95%? 90%? 80%?? If less than everything, what in your view are the next biggest explanatory factors after incentives?
Inquiring minds want to know… and you are welcome to more than five words for your answer
Thanks, Andy. I would say incentive structures explain 100% of the stuff that's capable of being explained by any theory--that is, the stuff that's not random. A big chunk of what goes on is random--e.g. why the coin lands on heads vs. tails. Randomness is hugely important, but we're trying to explain the part of reality that is not random. That is all we can do. And when we look at that part, incentives are everything.
Thx for the response.
Be clear I am totally with you that incentives explain an awful lot. The overwhelming majority.
But your claim is there is no free will at all?
And more specifically, that Adam Smith - the literal godfather of incentives! - in The Theory of Moral Sentiments was wrong when he said not only that humans want to be loved (again, your point) but also lovely? That they will not do the selfless good act even when they are certain no one is watching, if it causes them any negative self-interested harm at all?
Or are you suggesting that a person's view of themselves - self-deception or not - and desire to see themselves as good is just another incentive? But that of course, is a personal, intrinsic incentive, no?...
Yes, I do believe we have an incentive to see ourselves as good, but that is ultimately rooted in the desire to convince other people that we're good. We are better able to convince other people if we first convince ourselves. I write about this point here: https://www.optimallyirrational.com/p/the-truth-about-self-deception
Yeah, ok. I don't buy it. Irrespective of any evolutionary root you claim for it. Even if "We are better able to convince other people if we first convince ourselves" is 100% gospel truth.
At this point imo your claim that incentives explain everything is no longer explanatory, it's simply reductionist. I'll stick with Smith.
But thanks again for the interesting piece, especially the wonderful explication of "likability determinism." That portion is an excellent contribution to understanding human behavior / thought processes / irrationality.
Hm, curious. What don’t you buy? I agree with Smith that we want to be lovely, according to what our cultural peers deem lovely. And we want to convince ourselves that we’re lovely, so that we can better convince our peers. Those count as incentives. What’s the part you disagree with?
I disagree that a person's desire to be lovely is 100% caused by external incentives.
I disagree in particular that someone performing a "selfless" act, which is partly against his/her self-interest, when essentially certain that no one is watching, is solely or even primarily because of the incentive to self-deceive merely so that we can *better* convince others because of the incentive to be liked by others. If this fits your definition of incentives, then you have made the definition if not meaningless, then watered down to the point of no longer being nearly as useful.
Even were I to concede that your imo extreme definition of incentives and explanation of behavior was plausible, it doesn't make it likely, let alone probable, in terms of actually explaining human nature, behavior and decision-making today.
In other words, I believe that morality exists and that free will exists, and that even though incentives explain an enormous amount, they do not explain everything (other than a "random" unexplainable residual, per you).
You are definitively NOT agreeing with Smith on "being lovely", based on your description. While its definition is of course related to what our cultural peers deem lovely, being lovely is not defined exclusively by them, and it is certainly *distinct* from being loved by our peers, but you have already conflated the two.
As a non-trivial example, I believe that morality, much more than incentives (or "randomness*), explains why a lot of the fraction of 18-29 year olds who did *not* choose "Back Hamas" in the wake of the Oct 7th rampage made that choice, as oppose to the almost-equal fraction of miseducated young Americans who did [see Oct and Dec 2023 Harvard-Harris polls for the horrifying numbers here.] Obviously there are other factors than morality at play here (ability to reason, ...), but not all is explained by incentives, even if again I readily agree that quite a lot is.
Thanks for elaborating. Seems the disagreement lies in our differing views on free will and morality. Fair enough. I do have controversial views on those topics, and I don’t expect everyone to agree. Ultimately the reason I reject free will and morality as explanations (independent of incentives) is because they clash with the theory of evolution. They make no Darwinian sense. If you’re interested in the reasons why, I’d recommend my piece Darwin the Cynic. In any case, I’ll leave you with the question of how freely willed morality or selflessness could evolve if it is disconnected from anything that could affect fitness. I think it’s a picture of human nature that contradicts (or fits very poorly with) the only theory we can be pretty much be 100% is confident is true: evolution. That’s why I reject it. Thanks for reading and engaging in good faith. Cheers.
Well, given your Substack title, I'm gonna call BS.
First of all, you completely misunderstand Darwinism if you claim that anything that does not positively affect fitness cannot evolve as a package with other things that do. "Random" genetic mutation can and does indeed cause traits that survive despite their non-optimality. IMO you are now conflating Darwinism with Panglossianism.
Go search the Internet, perhaps, and you will see that Darwin believed in free will, and that many Darwinians view it as completely compatible with Darwinism. The idea that free will and morality are incompatible with Darwinism is nigh on ridiculous. But to be clear, this disagreement is not solely, nor even primarily, about whether you believe in "free will" per se.
And that's above and beyond the obvious point that over the last few thousand years, morality and the beyond-tribal-group measure of trust that it helps enable is in fact a positive fitness factor.
You unscientifically conflate ideas that are *largely* explanatory with assertions that they are *fully* so.
IMO Einstein's (paraphrased) quote of "Make everything as simple as possible, but no simpler" is directly relevant here.
But I do acknowledge there is one place you are being consistent. You value status and you have an incentive to make more outrageous claims in order to attain that status (or go for the tiny chance of what you view as much higher status), even if those claims lack not only evidence but require non-logic to get there.
My personal issue now is that your almost-total-certainty about incentive determinism being all-explanatory, and the (il)logic you use to try to justify it, means I am forced to discount as perhaps almost-randomness your excellent explanation of the differences between "incentive determinism" and "likability determinism".
In other words, whether because I'm concerned about my social status in promoting a crackpot, or just my intrinsic free will beliefs, I can't take you seriously, even though I love a couple of your narratives as being really good and helpful (when not taken to an unjustified extreme).
If you had a bit more epistemic humility ("I believe there is a good chance 'incentive determinism' explains nearly everything, but I know it doesn't explain literally everything, and I'm open to the possibility that it merely explains quite a lot"), I wouldn't have that problem...
Cheers.
It's fine to call my views bullshit, but there's no need to be rude about it or resort to name-calling. I think you are misunderstanding me. If you read the piece on Darwinian cynicism, you will see that I am not endorsing panglossianism. And the reason I am so confident in incentive determinism is not that I'm an arrogant fool, but because I see it as tautological. There are things in the world that we want, and we try to get them. That explains the nonrandom portion of our behavior. I honestly don't see what else could explain that portion of our behavior, aside from magic. Tell me what explains the nonrandom portion of our behavior other than us seeking what we want. Or tell me why I'm wrong about the list of things we want. What things am I missing? If there's something I'm missing, feel free to add it to the list as an incentive. If it's evolutionarily plausible, either as an adaptation or a byproduct of an adaptation (or a random mutation), I'll buy it, and I'll add it to the list myself. I'm genuinely not sure where the disagreement lies, or where the hostility is coming from.
Well, first, if my word choices offend you, I strongly suggest you change the name of your blog.
Fair question re: where the "hostility" is coming from:
- first, your original piece was interesting enough to be "worth it" (again the compliment: if you were just stupid or seemed purely a whacko, I would have just ignored you as not worthy of engaging with.)
- if your thesis and thus definition of determinism is tautological, it immediately becomes profoundly uninteresting. OTOH, I don't think you actually *do* mean it as purely tautological (see below)
- you at least recognize that your incentive determinism theory doesn't explain 100% of all human behavior, with your acknowledgement of a "random" component. But then...
- you are way beyond anything I've seen in terms of social science with a claim that your theory/story *completely* explains *all* human behavior. Frankly, even explaining an overwhelming majority is extremely rare (and one more time, I actually DO think your theory DOES indeed do that). I know far more about social sciences than I do about biology or sociobiology, but I don't think even biologists will generally claim that their pared down simple theories explain *everything*.
- I told you you were wrong about at least 1 thing we want: to be lovely (feel ourselves moral), even when no one is looking. But you either deny that that is possible, or claim, without either evidence or credible logic, that any such impulse is solely/entirely in service of other incentives.
- and if I am only allowed to categorize things that you are missing as incentives, as you just said above, you are explicitly ignoring me, and ignoring any legit scientific method.
- the nature of science, even social science, is to put forth something falsifiable. Your "everything that is not incentives is random" assertion is not falsifiable. At minimum, how can you not see/concede the *possibility* that some of what you classify as "random" might be able to be explained by someone else, in terms of something other than incentives?
- In this last note, you cite a quite reasonable word/standard: plausibility. But free will and morality are *of course* evolutionarily *plausible*. That's a very different standard than proven, probable or even likely. And not that it should be necessary, but I gave you an explanation above of why morality would be a positive Darwinian trait for humans in the last several thousand years. By contrast, you have surely NOT proven that it is not only a harmful trait, but so overwhelmingly harmful a one that it surely could not possibly have survived human evolution at even a minimal level.
- finally, the complete lack of epistemic humility - unwillingness to entertain/acknowledge even the *possibility* that you might be wrong, especially given that you are making *such* an incredibly strong claim of *completely* explaining human behavior - something too difficult for the greatest minds in history to have ever done - just rubs me the wrong way, for someone who at least *seems* to be talking about (social) science.
For that last, I guess I apologize for letting it set me off a bit.
Good stuff. It occurs to me that, although you never said it explicitly, this argument essential negates the idea of intrinsic motivation. That as long as there are other human beings around, all our incentives are external. That's a pretty big swing at the field of motivational research.
Thanks, Brian. Yes, I’m happy to take a swing at that field. I think a good chunk of what we consider intrinsic motivation (stuff we do “for its own sake”) is actually extrinsically motivated by social rewards, because those social rewards are often contingent on the appearance of intrinsic motivation. For example, we give people status for being brave and authentic and not caring what others think—i.e. being “intrinsically” motivated. I talk about this a lot in my preprint on psyarxiv “the evolution of social paradoxes.” My post “status is weird” summarizes most of the argument in non-academese. And my post “Darwin the cynic” makes an argument for why non-selfish, non-groupish, non-nepotistic motivations (which typically characterize our supposedly “intrinsic” motivations) are evolutionarily implausible. Though I might make an exception for some parts of our aesthetic motivations (which might have selfish benefits related to being in optimal environments or fine-tuning our perceptual equipment), most of our “intrinsic” motivations are bullshit.
I love this article and among my very favorite of yours, David - but I gotta object, foreclosing altogether on absolutely anyone's ability to transcend our evolutionary drivers and achieve authentic selfless altruism? There are positive outliers in any distribution... in any event, your over-the-top cynicism, your "cold, alien view" makes for super fun reading. What a writer you are!
Thank you for the kind words, Donald. I think I might be more pessimistic than you about our ability to transcend our basic evolved motives, though we might be able to channel those motives in beneficial directions with the right incentive structures. Our potential to do that, plus a bit of luck from the occasional outlier (a possibility you rightly note), gives me enough hope to get out of bed in the morning. Cheers.
Wonderfully brilliant. Insight about ourselves offers hope.
pattern recognition emergent feedback
Constraints are great...
Enjoyed this, but think I can poke a hole.
"People don’t like incentive determinism because it’s disorienting. It tells us that our single greatest obsession, likability, is a distraction."
Perhaps. But the lonely nerd in his bedroom could probably do with focusing on being more likeable. He might be incentivised to do it, might know he's incentivised to do it, but not know how to or, if he does, not be able.